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The UDF is essentially a federation linking a large and
heterodox collection of organisations varying in function, size, and
popular impact. It is strongest in the Eastern Cape, traditionally the
stronghold of the ANC, with which many local UDF leaders are
historically associated. Class and communal cleavages as well as the
presence of rivals with a popular following, make the UDF comparatively
weaker in Cape Town and Durban. In the industrial heartland of the
Transvaal, the UDF is undoubtedly paramount, but the sheer size of the
urban centres, their social complexity, and the uncertainties of the
UDF' s relationship with a well-established trade union movement, make
its own capacity for marshalling disciplined support questionable. In
the Transvaal, to a greater extent than in its other four main regions,
the UDF has come to depend upon a tacit alliance with an increasingly
politicised yet politically independent trade union movement. Any
analysis of the UDF, though, should not be limited to the bureaucratic
boundaries of its often patchy organisation, for the UDF functions more
in the fashion of a social movement than a deliberately contrived
political machine. With this consideration in mind, two questions need
examining. Which social constituencies does the UDF represent? Is it
possible to perceive in the UDF•s ideological discourse the interests or
concerns of particular social classes?
LEADERSHIP
Of course, in one essential sense, the UDF is a working class movement.
In a social context in which a black bourgeoisie scarcely exists, in
which members of petty bourgeois or middle class groups at best
constitute a thin layer, and in which the rural population is largely
proletarianised or at least dependent on wage labour, any popular
organisation has to have a working-class base. This is as true for a
conservative movement such as inkatha, as for a radical one like the
UDF, To understand the social character of a political body it is more
helpful to look at leadership, or rather different layers of leadership,
and the relationship leaders have with particular constituencies.
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Taking the national executive, together with the five most developed
regions, the most recently elected UDF leadership comprises sixty-six
people1- The majority of these are men - only eight are women. They are
mainly young; of fifty whose ages can be specified, seventeen are in their
thirties, eleven in their early forties, and six in their twenties. Four
are in their fifties and ten are over sixty. Fifteen are ANC veterans;
most of these are in the over-sixties group but it includes younger men who
were involved in clandestine ANC activities in the 1960s and 1970s. Of the
ANC group, five were also members of tinkhonto we Sizwe, seven were involved
in SACTU (in seme cases the same people), and seven have served long prison
sentences for political offences in Robben Island or Pretoria Fort,
Another four UDF leaders received prison terms after the 1976 Soweto
uprising. Apart frcm the Congress group (augmented by another four people
associated with the NIC and TIC revivals), UDF executives include former
adherents of the Liberal Party (2), the Coloured Labour Party (2), the
Black Consciousness Movement (6), and the Unity Movement (1). Socially,
UDF leadership is heavily middle class - eleven fran highly paid
professional backgrounds - legal, medical or academic, and three priests,
eight teachers, a nurse, a legal clerk, a social worker, a researcher, and
two technicians. Amongst the other leaders who occupations can be
identified, 17 are workers, three of them skilled artisans and the rest
labourers or industrial workers. At least four of the workers are
full-time trade union officials. The working class group also includes the
SACTU veterans, some of whan are no longer working. Finally, there are six
executive members who are professional activists, mainly youth or student
congress organisers. Notably absent from the UDF leadership are people
fran middle-level management, modern commercial occupations, township
business, and petty trading. There are traders, though, in one of the
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regional executives, not covered in this survey, the Northern Transvaal.
UDF leadership, finally, is predominantly African, though the five
2
executives also include six Indians, eight coloureds, and five whites .
Regionally, the two largest executives. Natal and Transvaal, are
socially the most heterodox. The Western Cape's fourteen members are
almost evenly balanced between workers and professionals, with three of the
seven professionals fran working-class backgrounds. The Eastern Cape's
executive canprises two old SACTU/llnkhonto stalwarts, two teachers, a
factory worker, and a technician with some experience as a trade union
organiser. Too little data is available on the Border executive to make
useful generalisations.
The Transvaal executive provides the most representative social
profile of the movement as a whole: it is the most youthful and has an
unusually high proportion of people (ten) with sane experience in both the
1970s and 1980s of working in youth organisations. There is the most
3
detailed data for Natal's executive ; i t is arranged in the table below:
(TABLE 2)
What is demonstrable fran this biographical profile is true also for
other executives. Though the Natal leadership falls largely into the
professional/middle class categories, sociological classifications are not
by themselves very helpful. For these are people who have often become
prominent in the organisation of popular movements around the.
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Age: 72; Profession: lawyer; residence: Clermont, Durban;
Organisational affiliation: ANC, Liberal Party, Joint
Cormuters' Cannittee, Release Mandela Conmittee.
Age: 52; Profession: priest; residence: Lanontville, Durban;
Organisational affiliation: ANC, vice-chairman - JDRAC.
Age: c. 60; Profession: trade unionist; residence: Durban;
Organisational affiliation: NIC, Natal secretary - SACTJ,
Umkhonto we Sizwe (1963-^983), Robben Island).
Age: c. 30; Profession: attorney; residence: Durban;
Organisational affiliation: NIC.
Age: 31; Profession: teacher/translator; residence:
Lamontville, Durban; Organisational affiliation: JORAC,
Lamontville Youth Organisation.
Age: 43; Profession: midwife/lawyer; residence: Umlazi,
Durban; Organisational affiliation: treasurer - RMC, Unlazi
Water CarmLttee, Natal Organisation of Women,
Age: 46; Profession: doctor/academic; residence: Durban;
Organisational affiliation: NIC.
Age: 30; Profession: researcher; residence: Sydenham, Durban;
Organisational affiliation: Durban Housing Action Canmittee.
Age: c. 50; Profession: labourer; residence: Unlazi, Durban;
Organisational affiliation: ANC (Pobben Island), HtfC, Unlazi
Residents' Association,
Age: 35; Profession: teacher; residence: Clarewater, Durban;
Organisational affiliation: coordinator - NECC.
Age: c. 25; Profession: technician; Organisational
affiliation: AZASO, NAYO, NECC.
Age: 42; Profession: upholsterer; residence: Durban;
Organisational affiliation: Labour Party (1969-1979),
Furniture and Allied Workers' Union, DHH2.
Age: 35; Profession: medical technician; Organisational
affiliation: Natal Organisation of Wcmen.
Age: c. 45; Profession: teacher/Director - Diakonia
(Ecumenical organisation); residence: Durban; Organisational
Diakonia.
Profession: teacher/trade unionist;
affiliation: National Federation of Workers.
Organisational
Age: c. 60; Profession: activist; residence: Durban;
Organisational affiliation: GWU (Garment Workers' Union),
ANC, SACTU, Kwa Mashu Residents' Association (1960), South
African Railway and Harbour Workers Union, Unkhonto we Sizwe
(Robben Island, 1964-1984).
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preoccupations of the poor: rents, housing conditions, transport, and the
cost of services. They belong to an intellectual middle-class rather than
an entrepreneurial one. Mobilised youth is well represented on the
executive, both generationally, and with youth organisation office
bearers. Organised labour is under-represented considering its strength in
Natal; its 1 imited presence in the tWD 1950s trade unionists and the
President of the National Federation of Workers indicate the distance
between the Natal UDF and contemporary mainstream black trade unionism.
For the UEF, though it is very largely a movement of the poor, is not
one which normally mobilises its following through direct appeals to class
identity. Its preferred social constituencies are usually socially
amarphous: 'youth', 'ccmnunity', or 'progressive' whites. This is partly a
reflection of the historical experiences of the last decade: educational
breakdown, school-leaver unemployment, demographic explosion, the fiscal
disarray of local government, the rising cost of living, and the state's
efforts to create for itself a widened popular legitimacy. The conflicts
produced by such developments do not lend themselves to precise social
configurations. Then there is the ideological legacy of the Congress
tradition which stresses social unity rather than class confrontation.
Finally, there is the disproportionate share in leadership of a radicalised
intelligentsia whose members, even if they are philosophically influenced
by Marxism, speak a language very removed from the experience and culture
of working class people. As a correspondent in Grassroots observed after
the UEF launch:
Most of these workers are not educated. That is why there are
no workers in the UEF. To open your mind, if you can look at
the meeting that was held at Mitchell's Plain. The workers were
there. But the workers didn't understand what that meeting was
for. Because the language that was used, is the language that
is not known by the workers 4 .
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When UEF leaders do speak a popular language, i t i s usually (though not
always, as we sha l l see) a populist one. This i s not surprising, for t h e i r
most deeply fe l t area of ccmmon experience with t he i r working c l a s s
constituency i s not the struggle between cap i t a l and labour, but ra ther the
confl ic t between people and s t a t e .
TTffTgJJGY
What the UDF stands for ideologically i s complicated. F i r s t , i t i s a
social coa l i t ion embracing different groups which have different socia l ,
p o l i t i c a l and economic agendas. Such differences, though, are not always
eas i ly apparent frcm formal statements and authorised comments. Secondly,
the UDF's character i s to a degree shaped by the conscious views and
perceptions of i t s ideologues, but i t i s a lso influenced, perhaps more
profoundly, by the behaviour and cul ture of i t s popular following. The
organisa t ion ' s ideological impetus may derive as much frcm the
unselfconscious perceptions and actions of ordinary people as the
in te l l ec tua l constructs of sophisticated leaders .
Hie UEF was conceived of as a t r a n s i t i o n a l front, not a p o l i t i c a l
party, nor a r i v a l to already establ ished l ibe ra t ion organisations.
Consequently, i n i t i a l programmatic statements were usually limited to a few
key pr inciples intended to unite the broadest of social spectrums: 'frcm
workers to students, frcm pr ies t s to businessmen, Nyanga t o Chatsworth, t o
5
Scweto t o Elsies River1 . The UEF stood for nonracial 'unity of a l l
people ' , for a 'government based on the w i l l of the people ' , for 'a
willingness to work together ' despite 'd i fferent approaches to the problems
tha t confront us ' . Notwithstanding the 'Char t e r i s t ' a l legience of some
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of the major organisations which affiliated to the Front, at its inception
leaders insisted that 'it was incorrect to link the UDF directly to the
7 8
Charter1 , that the UDF was 'not Charterist' . In fact, though, fron
the beginning, adherence to the Charter was viewed by most UDF leaders as
signifying an advanced stage of ideological progress. Albertina Sisulu,
opening the SOYCO launch in July 1983, held that the guidance supplied by
the Freedom Charter 'would prevent reactionary agents frcm hi-jacking the
9
struggle* . Samson Ndou informed a canmenorative meeting on 23 June 1983
'We want to place on record that we subscribe to the Freedan Charter.
Therefore we are members of the UDF' . TNAO years later, Western Cape
Secretary Trevor Manuel argued that different opinions and perspectives
. . . (are) emerging . . . ( i t) is necessary to do battle at the ideological
level to define a clearer ideological stance1 . Accordingly, UDF's
Update suggested:
Although the UDF has not adopted the Freedom Charter, "We
believe that the Freedom Charter is the most democratic document
expressing the wishes and aspirations of our people" 1 2 .
In June 1985, UDF affiliates distributed half a million copies of the
Charter on house to house visits and rallies to celebrate the 30th
13
anniversary of the Congress of the People , By April 1986, Stone Sizane
of the East Cape UDF executive was telling a local newspaper that the UDF
14
'subscribed to the Freedom Charter1
In reality acceptance of the Freedan Charter was understood as the
logical accompaniment to the perception of the 'National Democratic nature
15
of our struggle' . Such a struggle was one fo the 'broadest possible
alliance1 . It was a struggle of 'the people's camp', 'the overwhelming
majority of South Africans - the black working class, the rural masses, the
black petty bourgeoisie (traders), and black middle strata (clerks.
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teachers, nurses, intellectuals)1 as well as 'several thousand whites who
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stand shoulder to shoulder in struggle with the majority1 . The National
Democratic Struggle had three objectives: ' the struggle to remove all
racial oppression; the struggle to remove the grip of the monopoly
companies over our country; and the struggle to build democratic majority
rule in a unified South Africa'. In this struggle 'the UDF has identified
13
the working class as the leading class' . Why not, then, a struggle for
socialism? Largely because 'we most not forget there are different
interests among the oppressed. While they are united around the immediate
task of destroying national oppression, their long-term interests are not
19
identical' . Does the UDF, then, leave the question entirely open as to
which long-term interest in the end should predominate? That depends on
how attentively one reads the UDF's theoretical publications. In Isizwe,
an article on unemployment suggests that 'the struggle against unemploynnent
20
is also struggle against capitalism and national oppression' . Despite
such contentions, though, the anonymous writers in Isizwe are very critical
of those who view national democracy as a tactical concept rather than one
of long-term principle:
We are thinking here of those who pay lip service to our broad
struggle of national democratic struggle. That is, those who
say: 'Yes, the popular struggle, NDS is important'. But they do
not really believe these words in their hearts. For these
watered down workerists the national democratic struggle is
simply a tactic of the mcment. For them the broad front of the
UDF is an unfortunate and temporary structure. Our talk about
national democratic struggle is 'merely a concession to the
traditions and culture of the masses in South Africa'21 .
For mainstream UDF thinkers, 'weeding out' the petty bourgeoisie would be a
strategic mistake for it would risk increasing the prospects of the State
22
security 'more collaborators and more legitimacy' . In other words,
despite the antipathy to workerists, the virtues of social alliances for
democrats may have little to do with long-term ideological principles.
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Here some UtF leaders are quite unambiguous. Billy Nair, When asked
Aether he thought 'that capitalism would not survive the inplementation of
the Charter' replied:
Of coursel The implementation of the Charter is the first step
towards the establishment of socialism. The demands of the
Charter cannot be met within the present social, political and
economic order. The Charter serves as the basis fran which
workers can build a free, equal and just society. The Charter
is so far the only guarantee towards the realisation of that
peaceful society, it is not an end in itself 2 3 .
Not all UCF ideologues would go as far as this; the preferred formulation
is usually less specific:
At this point when these decisions are being made, the balance
of forces in the country would determine the shape of things to
cone. It would determine how quickly the demands in the Charter
could be implemented.
 2 4 ^ n e level of mass consciousness would
determine that too ...
Nair himself in a different later interview conceded that 'we are going to
have to carry over some of what exists in our present society into the new
one' and that it would be necessary 'to cater for small traders and small
farmers, and to even protect them as long as they do not threaten to beccme
big capitalists'. Opposition to big capital could provide an essential
unity of interests for all oppressed classes - 'the working class, in
particular, the small peasant, the small business people, even the small
manufacturer' - for all were enmeshed in 'the vice-grip of the massive
monopolies which have developed and vfriich are encouraged to develop by the
25
Nationalist government'
Opposition to monopoly capital, then, can be the principled basis for
unity between the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, and 'the middle
strata'. Even assuming that the nuances of UDF theoretical expositions are
widely understood within UDF leadership, which is unlikely, there is
clearly, within the framework provided by the notion of national democratic
struggle, roan for the expression of different positions. At leadership
levels these can be placed in three groups. For the sake of convenience,
these can be labelled nationalist, national democratic and socialist.
These categories are, of course, idealised; elements of all three positions
may influence to a greater or lesser degree the outlooks of individual
leaders.
The nationalist position was more conspicuous in the early days of the
UDF. Its strands usually include an emphasis on a heroic tradition of
nationalist resistance, the celebration of an inconography of martyrs and,
as a subsidiary element, a populist conception of economic nationalism.
Nationalist ideology is usually to the fore when leaders wish to express
the UDF' s intention to 'bring together all classes'. But it is also given
prominence by particular sections of leadership. The Release Mandela
Campaign, for example, often provides a platform for nationalist
sentiment. Its Transvaal Chairman and former UBF NEC member, Aubrey
Mokoena, is one of the foremost exponents of a nationalist position with
his pranotion of a cult of charismatic leadership around Nelson Mandela.
For Mokoena, Mandela ' is the pivotal factor in struggle for liberation. Ha
has the stature and charisma which derives frcm his contribution to the
struggle' . Mokoena's language is not atypical. Newa Ramgobin told his
audience at a Soweto RMC meeting in July 1984 that:
I want to make bold and say in clear language that the human
race must remain grateful, that the human race must go down on
its knees and say thankycu for the gifts it has been endowed
with the lives of the Nelson Mandelas of this country 27 .
Associated with the tendency to accord reverance to brave leaders is the
depiction of the Freedom Charter as a sacred symbol of patriotism. 'Betray
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the Freedon Charter and you betray the people', argued Zinzi Mandela at a
1983 TIC meeting, 'We consider i t treason to turn against the people's
demands as set out in the Freedom Charter' . This is not a view which
encourages discussion or debates as to how the Charter should be
interpreted or even which allows for the possibility of different
interpretations of the Charter being possible! For here the Charter is
understood as emanating fron an organically unified general will. On
economic issues, the language of UDF nationalism is often strongly
anti-capitalist, but i t is ccmmunalist, not socialist, in i t s
prescriptions. Allen Boesak in his evidence to the Carnegie Commission on
poverty described poverty as primarily a 'moral challenge' and delivered a
scathing critique of 'white greed' and 'free market1 econanics.
Nevertheless, despite his condemnation of 'the inequitable system which
capitalism i s ' his 'call for clear political action1 was firmly within a
well entrenched South African populist tradition:
To 'get up and walk' means for us no less than what i t meant for
the Afrikaner to whane DF Malan spoke, and that is to work for
the day political, social and economic change shall become a
reality, so that all South Africa's people, including the poor,
shall be able to live as God had intended for them to live. 29
Advocates of individual entrepreneurship are unusual, though, in the
UEF. They are not wholly absent but they are not strongly represented in
leadership. Nthato Motlana, Chairman of the Soweto Civic Association, and
a frequent spokesman on UDF platforms, is one of the very few popular
political figures who can be associated with a capitalist ideal. He is
currently, for example, one of four Soweto notables who have formed a
company, Black Equity Participation, with the aim of taking over the assets
30
of departing American corporations . Businessmen, though, are quite rare
even within the leaderships of local affiliates. It is the case that sane
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township traders were involved in the consumer boycott conmittees - in
31Pretoria, for example - and i t is true that the boycott organisers
appeared to envisage a progressive political role for business urging i t to
32become 'more aware of i ts political responsibilities . But businessmen
seem to have shied away frcm substantial involvement in civic structures.
In Tumahole, for example, in the Orange Free State, though the ad hoc
caimattee set up in July 1984 to lay the groundwork for a civic included
three shopkeepers and two priests, these people found they were too busy to
join the leadership of the Tumahole Civic when i t was launched in October.
They had apparently been frightened off, partly by the radical language of
the core group of student activists and trade unionists around which the
33
Civic started, and also by the risk of losing their trading licences
A capitalist perspective is unlikely to emerge in UDF nationalism from
the influence of the very small group of black entrepreneurs who have so
courageously participated in UDF-led structures. What is possible is that
the UXF leadership may tone down some of i t s economic rhetoric to win more
favour within the white community. If the UDF succeeds in any future
efforts directed towards winning a substantial white constituency, i t is
likely that there may emerge a rather stronger liberal democratic theme
than exists in UIF discourse at the nonent. Significantly, Billy Nair, in
a pamphlet issued during the 'Call to Whites' campaign, referred to
Lincoln's Gettysburg address as the essence of the UBF's conception of
34
democracy
The national democratic position is dominant within UDF leadership.
As we have seen i ts advocates understand the ultimate foe to be monopoly
capitalism but believe that opposition to capitalist imperialism in South
_ 12 _
Africa can, because of existence of national oppression, be most
effectively mobilised through a 'strategy of broad popular alliance1. The
working class is the leading class in such a strategy, but the social
objectives of the 'people's camp' would be both more and less than the
class interests of an industrial proletariat. Tne Freedom Charter
accommodates the aspirations of a broad range of groups; small businessmen,
professionals, peasants, and of course, workers. In fact, though 'national
democracy' is rarely spelt out at public meetings as carefully as it is in
polemical and academic journals. 'Capitalism, not whites, was what Black
people had to regard as the enemy1 proclaimed Curtis Nkondo, a member of
the first UDF NBC at the inauguration of Peyco 35. Significantly he spoke
in the Eastern Cape, where anti-capitalist sentiment appears to have a
genuine popular resonance. Here is Wbnga Nkala, president of the Uiterihage
Youth Congress addressing 30 000 people the day after the Langa massacre:
"The Western imperialists do not see or hear the cries of the
black majority. Their eyes are covered by gold-dust, and their
ears by diamonds. They are only concerned about the wealth they
are raping out of our country. So their response to the
massacre, led by Reagan, was hypocrisy of the worst kind. They
too are responsible for killing unarmed and defenceless people,
by supporting reactionary governments here and in other parts of
the world. Local capitalists called for all parties to meet.
They want to be heard protesting becauce they fear the massacre
will fuel the disinvestment lobby. But not out of concern for
u s ' 3 6 .
Nkala's speech was not unusual. According to State of the Nation in
October 1985, cannon themes at funerals have included ' the nature of
ijnperialist interests and their role in attempting to misdirect the
struggle? and the interests of the ruling class'. Elsewhere, though, there
has been evidently less unanimity on the nature and identity of
Imperialism. Allen Boesak in early 1985 invited Senator Kennedy to South
Africa. Kennedy spoke to enthusiastic meetings but not all UDF supporters
were hapfy. Through his visit, contended 'Doubtful* of Athlone, 'the broad
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aim of bringing working issues, especially economic demands of the UDF took
a step backvrards * thus preventing 'the development of the UDF into a
stronger, militant and tighter body1 3 7 .
For its interpreters, 'national democracy' is not liberal democracy.
In the view of a contributer to New Era, a Cape Town UDF affiliated
publication:
Democracy means, in the first instance, the ability of the broad
working masses to participate in and to control all dimensions
of their lives. This, for us, is the essence of democracy, not
seme liberal, pluralistic debating society notion of a 'thousand
schools contending' 3 8 .
For national democrats, democracy is created through the organisational
structures vfoich emerge in the course of struggle; it is these rather than
precisely elaborated social programmes which ensure that the ultimate
society will be one in which the needs of popular classes will be met. A
constant refrain in UEF speeches and statements is the notion that leaders
are at most bearers of a popular mandate, that as delegates they are
directly accountable, that democracy should be the politics of popular
participation. Hence, for example, the antipathy amongst many UDF
affiliates to the concept of a leaders' constitutional convention or a
39
Lancaster House type of transfer of political power . Now, of course, in
reality the UCF does not constantly function according to such
prescriptions. Strategic decisions have not in every instance emanated
fran or been sanctioned by mass meetings or street committees. But much
has depended upon grass roots initiatives. The stronger civic and youth
affiliates have often been organised and led by trade unionists vfao have
taken as their inspiration democratic trade union organisations. For
example, the Tumahole Youth Congress (TOXCO) took as its model the
40
structure of the Chemical Vforkers' Union at nearby Secunda . Such
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literal imitation is exceptional, but more widely the adoption by civics
during 1982-83 of fee-paying membership and elected branch officials grew
out of recent trade union experience in many centres. In particular, the
notion of a mandated leadership with very limited decision-making authority
is ascribable to the influence of trade unionism.
National democracy, then, allows for the construction of a radically
egalitarian social order. Such an order should be based on 'the will of
the people'. 'Our structures must becone organs of peoples' power'.
'Ordinary people (must) increasingly take part in all the decisions ... Few
41
people making all the decisions must end . This romantic conception of
the popular will pervading social and political organisation is often
linked with a spontaneous and voluntaristic understanding of political
struggle. During the Soweto consumer boycott, trade unionists on the
Ccmmittee objected to the youth stoning wholesalers' trucks which were
replenishing township shops. UDF leaders were reluctant to discipline the
youth: 'It is not our duty to tell then not to stone or burn the trucks.
42
We can only tell them why* . The people determine their own forms of
political assertion; leaders may inspire or advise but not prescribe.
Despite the disclaimers of its advocates, national democracy is in essence
populist, and it accaiutodates at best awkwardly the more disciplined and
vanguardist notions of class mobilisation.
Nevertheless, as should be clear by this point, socialists have found
roan beneath the UEF's umbrella. Certain trade unionists urge that workers
have no alternative but to participate in the UDF if their class objectives
are to be realised. 'By actively participating in these (broader)
struggles, we can influence their direction and goals. Worker leaders,
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emerging from the training ground of unions, can take their places amongst
the leadership of the political struggle . In a leaflet circulated in
1984 by the Transvaal Anti President's Council, socialism is perceived as
intrinsic to the process of national liberation:
We believe that the struggle in S.A. has two aspects (NOT phases
or stages). We believe that it is not enough just to have 'one
person - one vote'. For the majority of South Africans (namely
the working people) 'liberation' will be meaningless and empty
unless the economy is restructured because that is the only way
to guarantee significant and lasting improvements in the quality
of life of cur working people. Hence the CLASS STRUGGLE is a
vital component of our fight for change. Here the working class
and its allies confront the owning class and its allies.
Because of the increasing development and industrialisation of
the S.A. economy and the increasing organisation of the working
class into independent trade unions, we nerceive AN
INTENSIFICATION OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA AA .
Nor do all UEF socialists share the sanguine expectation that because 'it
is impossible to separate off Apartheid from the capitalism system ...
truly cannitted opposition to Apartheid ... will lay the foundations for a
45
fundamental change' . Hence the concern expressed by Port Elizabeth UEF
executive member, Derek S\*artz, about the:
... criticisms of the 'popular' nature of our strategies and
campaigns which did not emphasise the class nature of our
struggle ... students and youth, tend to dominate organisations
... Although many of them come from the working class, they have
a natural populist tendency. Workers have the experience which
youth do not have 46.
In fairness to students, their organisations have often been the first to
recognise that workers 'produce the wealth of our country and are the
crucial class in bringing about change'47 . Yet it is the case that
youthful activists have often been insensitive to the material
considerations which sometimes inhibit workers from supporting militant
political actions. In the context of white left student politics in which
the UEF finds its principal white constituency there has developed a ' left
opposition' with the UDF. This finds expression in an arcane critical
16
discussion of the internal colonialism thesis. Internal Colonialism is an
analytical approach to South African politics which originated with the
South African Communist Party. I t is today influential within UEF
intellectual circles in supplying the underpinning rationalisation for the
48
concept of national democracy . The critics of Internal Colonialism
stress the potential for the 'development of a so-opted middle class and
for the emergence of react inary nationalism' within the movement for
democracy. Fighting racial oppression challenges 'capitalism in i t s
present form' not in substance; ' i t does not guarantee i t s fundamental
. 49
transformation . The debate seems to be meet vigorous at the
predominantly white universities. I t may, though, have had a wider impact,
for in November 1986, Isizwe contained a strong attack on the 'watered down
workerists . . . within our own ranks' with their 'defeatist, passive
attitude towards the oppressed, black petty bourgeoisie and middle strata
in our country
Probably, the finer points of the argument within leadership echelons
between national democrats and socialists have not evoked much popular
interest. For amongst rank and file activists, working class identity and
a socialist understanding of exploitation are two themes which are
constantly recurrent in their public rhetoric and private perceptions.
Here is an extract frcm a leaflet distributed in Alexandra during the rent
boycott:
We won't pay to live in these Gettos (sic). We are treated like
donkeys, kept in these yards at night, but working for Baas in
the day. This Alexandra is like a donkey yard. They let us out
to work in Baas se Plek . . . . We produce the goods, but we get
low wages. And when we want to buy, things are very expensive.
Because the bosses have added big profit. We even are the ones
who build houses, but they are expensive. Our l i t t l e money is
taken away by rent and inflation, which are the other names for
profit. Who qets the profit? Goldstein, Schacat, the Landlord
Steve Burger 51.
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Similarly in Soweto an anti-eviction leaflet addressed its readers as
'writers and residents' and called for, in the event of evictions 'an
52industrial standstill' . One of the most striking indications of the
existence of a rank and file socialist consciousness is the testimony of
twenty-year old Comrade Bongani, a meniber of the Tumahole Youth Congress:
Question: What do you understand by capitalism?
It is a system of private ownership by certain individuals who own the
means of production. My parents, fron Monday to Friday can make a
production of Rl 000, but he or she is going to get, say, R50. So our
parents are being exploited so that individuals can get rich, that 's why I
53
prefer socialism, because the working class will control production
There is evidence, then, to suggest that, regardless of the delicate
qualifications to be found in the more cerebral definitions of National
Democracy, a substantial proportion of the UEF's conmitted following are
motivated through their class identity and inspired by a socialist vision.
Whatever the ideological predilections of the largely middle-class leaders
of the movement (and many, in any case, are ccmnitted to social
transformation), such a constituency would be very difficult to demobilise
in the event of a retrest fran radicalism after liberation. Popular
initiatives have played too important a role in the UEF's own development
for i t s ordinary participants to be reduced to the role of a passive
chorus. In the long term this may be the most important legacy of the
embreyonic institutions of popular participatory government which were
created in the course of 1985-1986. No understanding of the UEF's
ideological character can therefore be complete without a consideration of
the efforts to build and consolidate ' People' s Power'.
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PEOPLE'S POWER AND PEOPLE'S COURTS
UDF leaders use the phrase 'people 's power' to refer to the process in
which, af ter the collapse or abdication of local s ta te author i t ies , c iv ics
and youth organisations assumed administrative, judicia l , welfare, and
cultural functions within the i r respective communities. People's power was
often represented in modest and pragmatic projects. Fore example,
residents ' groups would, in the event of a breakdown in municipal services,
organise s t r ee t cleaning. Children would crea te 'people's parks ' on waste
g round, naming them after l iberat ion heroes, and decorating them with
gaily-painted scrap-metal sculptures. TVie NECC's subcommittees began
devising syllabuses for democratic and non-e l i t i s t history and English
courses. But of a l l the manifestations of people's power, the efforts of
local organisations to administer popularly acceptable forms of c i v i l and
criminal just ice were the most challenging t o the s t a t e ' s moral authori ty.
More than any other feature of the insurrectionary movement which the UBF's
structures straddle, people's jus t ice t e s t i f i e s to the UDF's social and
ideological complexity as well as the extent to which i t has been shaped
frcm below by popular culture.
Pol i t i ca l ac t iv is ts claim that people began to bring complaints or
disputes to community organisations almost frcm their inception. This
reflected a widespread lack of confidence in the police which was
accentuated with the outbreak of confl ict in 1984. Police were reputed to
be inaccessible and unhelpful. The o f f i c i a l Commissioner's Courts were
54believed to be corrupt and arbitrary . The construction of an
alternative source of justice and civil order seems to have taken a similar
course in most centres. In Pretoria's Atteridgeville, with the effective
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extension of caniunity organisation at the beginning of the consumer
boycott in August 1985, ASRO leaders were asked to referee disputes between
neighbours or to resolve family arguments. In response the residents1
organisation opened an advice office. ASRO developed a decentralised
structure with eleven area committees. These canmittees began in late 1985
to function as 'people's courts' (though ASRO leaders disliked using this
phrase). The Advice Office became the ultimate authority to which people
could appeal. Only a minority of Atteridgeville streets had their own
canmittees by the second emergency, but where these did exist they handled
55
family disagreements . Before this system was elaborated, youth groups
held 'kangaroo courts'; apparently these characteristically were harsh and
56
unfair . Brutal kangaroo courts run by the Amabuthu emerged in Port
Elizabeth between July and September 1985 when PEECO and PEYCO leaders were
57
in detention . To curtail their spread, street and area canmittees
started to operate as courts. PEBOO's executive took on the function of
final arbiter. PEBCO officials claimed that their courts, in contrast to
the Amabuthu tribunals, never inflicted physical punishment. Both in Port
Elizabeth and in Uitenhage the activists recognised limits to their
judicial canpetance; murder cases, for example, were referred to the
58
police . In Alexandra a more formalised structure developed. Though the
yard, block and street canmittees were empowered to settle quarrels, for
intractable issues and for theft and assault cases, five members of the
Action Committee were nominated in February 1986 to sit in judgement. The
court was held at regular intervals in a roan specially reserved for the
purpose. During its operation public complaints at the nearby police
59
station declined by 60 per cent . Comparable systems of people's justice
emerged in many of the other centres where strongly structured local
organisations existed. In the Transvaal this included Krugersdorp's Kagiso
- 20 -
and Munsieville, Duduza outside Nigel, t^emelodi (Pretoria), Letsilele
(Tzaneen), and Soweto. In the Eastern Cape, people's courts functioned in
most towns through late 1985 and early 1986.
'The People's Court is not simply a bourgeois court taking place in a
back roam in a ghetto' insisted a pamphlet circulated in Atteridgeville:
Unlike the present legal systen, i t should not be biased in
favour of the powerful and must not simply be a means whereby
the interests of the powerful are ensured at the expense of the
oppressed and the exploited
The solution to each crime 'must conclude with a political thing' 6 1 .
Mvocates of people's justice emphasise i t s conciliatory nature: the
ultimate aim is the social reintergration of the offender. Thieves are
enjoined to return property or compensate owners. In one well-publicised
Alexandra case, the thief, a habitual offender, was placed under the
supervision of a canrdttee comprising AAC members, the man frcm whom he
stole, and his nephews. This would ensure that he stopped drinking and
62
squandering his savings . In Uitenhage, courts 'are not trying to
imitate the white courts or trying to beat people. They are trying to
63
create peace among the people' . With those miscreants who resist the
injunction 'to become one of us1 the ultimate sanction, Atteridgeville
64
organisers claimed, was ostracism . Youthful comrades in Port Elizabeth
who persisted in beating people up 'would be suspended* and not allowed to
wear PEYCO T-Shirts
Apart frcm trying criminals, in several centres courts imposed curfews
to lower the incidence of street brawl ing and alcohol-related violence,
Officials ordered shebeens to close early. Comrades searched sheebeen
customers for weapons. Amabuthu or Comrades authorised as 'marshalls' by
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the civics would police the curfews. In Atteridgeville people complained
that marshalls stole during the searches. Area caitnittees took on the duty
of weapon searches. Civic activists claim that such measures were
effective in reducing the nurrfoer of violent crimes. The organisations were
sufficiently effective in their judicial role that the police themselves
66
referred cases to them
This is the picture of people's justice provided by leading township
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activists quoted in UDF literature and other sympathetic accounts . I t
may be rather idealised. For example, in Mamelodi, the Youth Organisation
established disciplinary ccmmittees in each street. In the event of a
crime these could convene a court from any street residents who wished to
participate. At least one disciplinary committee sanctioned physical
punishment. Its constitution . . . . 25 lashes with a sjambok for 'robbery in
the name of the struggle1, 15 for rape, and 5 for disrespect to teachers.
In Mamelodi, as elsewhere, court officials denied they executed the
68
guilty . Courts which sanctioned such methods as the 'necklace', they
said, were Kangaroo courts 6 9 . They were not connected with their
organisations. In Soweto, Port Elizabeth, a shanty town created after the
upgrading of Kwa-Ford and the expulsion of i t s poorer tenants, a people's
court was administered fcy the Conmittee of Ten. The Committee claimed
allegience to PEBCO but this was disputed both by PEBCO and young militants
in Soweto. Ttie courts in Soweto were notorious for necklacing. On
9 February 'hundreds of UEF supporters, mostly youths, gathered in the
streets of Soweto to seek out the dissidents •, that is the Committee of
70Tten. Next day, five charred bodies were discovered . In Kleiskool,
outside Port Elizabeth, a fifteen year old rapist was stoned and then
stabbed to death after being 'pointed out to Comrades' ty the family of a
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12 year old rape and murder victim . Civic leaders opposed necklacing
but not everybody shared their conciliatory vision of justice. In Port
Elizabeth there was a ' tendency, if people were dissatisfied with the
decision (of the area camiittees), to go to the Amabutho to charge them to
72
sort i t out1 . A recent court case found the fcnabutho guarding PEBOO's
president, Edgar Ngoyi guil ty of burning to death one of Ngoyi's v i s i to rs ,
a young AZAFO meniber who had cane to the PEBOO chief to beg forgiveness for
73
his role in a petrol bomb attack . Pascal Damoyi, a resident of
Alexandra and a member of the worker!st Residents' Association, contributes
a disillusioned account of people's justice in Alexandra. Action Canmittee
and Civic Association comrades arrived to sort out a quarrel in his yard.
A family had built a wall which had encroached upon the space of other
households. Both sets of comrades were ' aggressive, and in a bloody
mood'. They took the sides of their respective ccrrplainants, willing to
appear accountable only to their 'clients' rather than al l the yard's
inhabitants. They threatened to sjambok those who objected to their ruling
(which upheld the rights of the wall-builders). This may have been an
atypical incident - i t occurred in an area in which no organised ccmmittees
74
existed
In Mamelodi, MAYO people saw they system as exemplifying entrenched
popular custan: 'You have to understand th i s fran a t radi t ional point of
view. People in the community must judge others . You cannot look at i t
fran a white point of view'. Consequently in the case of offenders being
burnt, such 'ac ts are not criminal, they are punishments and judgements fcy
the people1 75« In Alexandra t radi t ion was also summoned to defend the
courts by a resident interviewed in The Star:
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A popular belief, deeply rooted in society i s tha t some problems
in our townships are beyond the white man's law. Only the
people's courts, guided by senior c i t i zens , are competant to s i t
in t r i a l s . We do not understand why seme white man's laws
should be applied in what are purely domestic affairs 7 6 .
I t i s possible that a t least in some centres the jus t ice dispensed through
UCF af f i l i a tes represented not so much an innovation as an adaption or
reformulation of existing communal mechanisms of social control . In
Mamelodi, for example, several systems of 'subterranean' jus t ice operated
in the la te 1970s and early 1980s. In one ward a crime prevention unit of
householders called the 'volunteers' met regularly to administer floggings
to ' recalc i t rant youths over whan parents of the ward had los t con t ro l ' .
The volunteers policed the ward with teams of whistle blowing vigilantes
unti l an end was put to thei r punitive actions by the Community Council.
The volunteers also helped resolve family and neighbourly squabbles.
Notwithstanding the floggings, ' the central aim of the Ward Four court
proceedings' was ' t o prevent the breaking of relationships and to make i t
possible for partners t o live together amicably'. The volunteers were
rivalled and eventually eclipsed by a po l i t i c a l organisation, the Vukani
Vulimehlo People's Party. The WPP l a t e r contested and won the Ccmmunity
Council elections but before th is , i t b u i l t up a predominantly youthful
following governed by a mi l i tar i ly styled hierarchy. I t ran a secretive
and extremely brutal 'Lekgotla' t o enforce i t s t e r r i t o r i a l claims, to
maintain organisational discipline, and uphold law and. order. The WPP
also offered protection to shebeen owners. The WPP enjoyed same pol i t ica l
popularity; i t s opposition to shack removals and high rents explained i t s
victory after a relat ively high 28 per cent part icipat ion in the 1983
Council election. Nevertheless, essent ia l ly the WPP ftnetioned through a




Clearly the people's just ice activated by MAYO had l i t t l e in common
with the coercive cabal of Nilazi ' s Makgotla. The WPP courts conflicted
with other folk conceptions of just ice which emphasise judgement by one's
peers, informal open procedures, and popular access ib i l i ty . The
volunteer' s courts also differed fron MAYO' s disciplinary committees
because they were run exclusively by householders (rent-payers) and were
largely directed at youth. But the three a l l sprang fron a cannon
perception of the inadequacy of off icial law. And, as with the ea r l i e r
ins t i tu t ions , MAYO ac t iv i s t s would claim for t h e i r disciplinary oanmittees
the sanction of communal t radi t ion .
Mamelodi may have been a special case but i t i s unlikely; various
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forms of Makgotla have existed in other centres . I t is probable,
therefore, that people's justice expressed an ideological synthesis;
externally derived concepts such as, for example, a socialist critique of
bourgeois courts, overlaying but not obliterating more widely held folk
notions of justice and discipline. These could have been especially
influential when camiunity organisations successfully incorporated older
people into their structures. In Graaf Reinnet, for example, the Lutheran
church supplied a ready-made grassroots network: 'most of the street
79
representatives are elders and evangelists' . Not that the invocation of
tradition was the monopoly of older people. In Sekhukhuniland, Lebowa,
this was tragically evident in March 1985 when thirty-two people were burnt
to death after accusations of witchcraft. Witchburnings are not a frequent
feature of social life in this region but they have been historically
evident during periods of socio-economic tension or political strife.
Witches are blamed for lightning strikes which happen especially often at
times of drought. The 1985 witchburnings introduced two departures from
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custon. They were carried out by youths without the normal affirmation of
80guilt by nyangas, and the executions were through the necklace method .
In towns the victims of necklacing are often suspected informers or
collaborators 'with the system' (a category which fran a partisan
perspective can range across a broad spectrum - community councillors to
members of AZAPO). In August 1986, a Soweto journalist recorded in her
diary witnessing the distraught mother of a necklaced child 'in a state of
81
shock . . . mumbling that her child is not a witch, but is sick'
The political activists' conception of justice is an essentially
humane one. There is no firm evidence to suggest that UDF affiliates have
sanctioned or condoned necklacing or similarly brutal forms of killing.
But outside the ranks of disciplined cadres there exists a much wider
movement which the UDF can claim as a constituency. Even among the
activists there is not the same emphasis on the rehabilitative purpose of
justice which one finds in the perceptions of leaders. In Mamelodi, MAYO
members talk about the necessity to 'get the lumps out of the canmunity
82
. . . the unwanted elements' . As mentioned, justice-seekers in Fbrt
Elizabeth if they were dissatisfied with the decisions of the people's
courts, turned to the amabutho for more severe retribution against
suspected criminals. The people's courts instituted by UEF affiliates were
different fran earlier forms of unofficial justice because they were
motivated try a deliberate effort to replace the organs of the State and in
so doing trans form social relationships. But people' s justice did not
evolve in a cultural vaccuum? i t was shaped as much by popular beliefs and
folk morality as the programmatic concerns of activists. As such i t could
be ideologically ambivalent, drawning alternately on visions of a classless
future and Utopian nostalgia for a harmonius past.
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